We present a quantum communication protocol which keeps all the properties of the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] but improves the capacity doubly as the ping-pong protocol. Alice and Bob can use the variable measurement basises in control mode to detect Eve's eavesdropping attack. In message mode, Alice can use one unitary operations to encode two bits information. Bob only needs to perform a Bell type measurement to decode Alice's information. A classical message authentification method can protect this protocol against the eavesdropping hiding in the quantum channel losses and the denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Since the reduced density matrices, ρ A = tr B {|ψ ± >< ψ ± |} are completely mixture, then one can not distinguish the state |ψ ± > from each other by only access one qubit. Since the state |ψ ± > are mutually orthogonal , a measurement on both qubit can perfectly distinguish the states form each other. Bob sends one of the photon (travel photon) to Alice and keeps another (home qubit). Alice can performs a unitary operation U j ,
where j ∈ {0, 1}, on the travel qubit to encode her information j. Then she sends this qubit back to Bob. When Bob receives the travel qubit, she performs a joint measurement on both photons to decode Alice's information. To confirm the security of this communication, Alice randomly switches the message mode to control mode. In control mode Alice measures the travel qubit in basis B z = {|0 >, |1 >}and announces the result in the public channel. When receiving Alice's result, Bob also switches to control mode. Bob measures the home qubit in basis B z and compares the both results. If both results coincide, there is Eve in line. Else, this communication continues. In every message run, Alice encodes one bit on the travel qubit. As it is well known, there are four Bell states that are mutual orthogonal to each other, |ψ ± >, |φ ± >. And local unitary operation can transform these four states to each other. The Bell's states can be written as
where
Suppose Bob prepare an EPR pair in state |ψ − >. In message mode, Alice performs a unitary U ij to encode her information, where U ij are
corresponding to Alice's 00,01,10,11. When Bob receives the travel back qubit, he can performs a Bell type measurement in basis {|ψ ± >, |φ ± >} to decode Alice's information. Then one EPR pair can transmit two bits in every message run.
To ensure the security of this protocol, the control mode should be modified. In control mode. Alice receives the travel qubit. Alice performs a measurement randomly in the basis B z = {|0 >, |1 >} or B x = {|+ >, |− >}. Then she announces her measurement result and the basis through public channel. Bob also switches to control mode. He performs a measurement in the same basis Alice used. If both results coincide, then there is Eve in line. Else, Bob sends next qubit to Alice.
Since
, Eve can not distinguish each Bell state if she only attack the travel after Alice encoding operation. So she has to attack the travel in line B → A first. After Alice's encoding operation, she performs a measurement attack in line A → B to draw Alice's information. Let us assume that the state |ψ − > becomes ρ after Eve's attack in line B → A. Then the information Eve can gain from ρ is bounded by the Holevo quantity, χ(ρ) [17] . Because Holevo quantity decreases under quantum operations [17, 18] , then the mutual information Eve can gain after Alice's encoding operation is determined by χ(ρ). From
we know S(ρ) is the upper bound of χ(ρ). 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. Suppose
where F (|ψ − >, ρ) is the fidelity [19] of state |ψ − > and ρ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Therefore, the entropy of ρ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρ max with diagonal entries 1 − γ,
Let us discuss the relation between the fidelity F (|ψ − >, ρ) and the detection probability d. In control mode, when the states Alice and Bob shared are |φ ± >, their measurement results will coincide every time when they use the measurement B z . When the state they shared is |ψ + >, their measurement results will coincide when they use the measurement basis B x . Only their state is |ψ − >, they measurement results will never coincide. Since F (|ψ − >, ρ) 2 = 1 − γ, then the detection probability is d ≥ γ/2. From Eq. (9), we know when γ = 0, i.e., Eve does not attack the state |ψ − > in line B → A, the detection probability d = 0. When γ > 0, i.e., Eve can gain some of Alice's information, she has to face a nonzero risk d ≥ γ/2 to be detected. When γ = 3 4 , it has S(ρ max ) = 2, which implies Eve has chance to eavesdrop full of Alice's information. On this condition, it has the maximal detection probability d ≥ 3 8 . W ′ ojcik presented an eavesdropping scheme [15] which reveals that the ping-pong is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than 60%. A classical message authentification method can protect this ping-pong protocol against the eavesdropping hiding in the quantum channel losses. Actually, in this improved ping-pong protocol, the eavesdropping hiding in quantum channel losses can be detected because of the variable measurement basises in control mode.
In Ref. [16] , it has been shown that the ping-pong protocol can be attacked without eavesdropping. Eve can attack the travel qubit in line A → B. She can perform a unitary operation on the travel qubit to change the states. Also, she can performs a measurement on the travel qubit to destroy the EPR states. But any message authentification method can protect this protocol against the man-in-the-middle attacks with a reliable public channel.
